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Dramatising Intelligence History on the BBC: The Camp 020 Affair 
 
While there is a considerable literature that considers post-1945 British intelligence 
historiography, little attention has been given to non-print media, such as factual 
depictions of intelligence affairs broadcast on television or radio. Using previously 
closed material from the British Broadcasting Corporation’s written archives, this article 
explores how factual intelligence and security issues were represented by the BBC as the 
1970s drew to a close, through an examination of the Spy! television series, which 
approached episodes of recent intelligence history in a drama-documentary format. The 
second episode of the series, seen by millions of viewers, proved controversial owing to 
its depiction of a physical assault during interrogation at an MI5 facility, Camp 020, 
during the Second World War. The article explores the fallout from this episode, as 
numerous Camp 020 veterans made great efforts to point out that such physical violence 
had never taken place. For the most part, this struggle was played out in private 
correspondence with the BBC, while the general public was left with little reason to 
question what had been shown, thereby allowing the association of wartime British 
intelligence with physical abuse to go unchallenged.  
 
While a well-developed body of literature exists that considers post-1945 British intelligence 
historiography, little attention has been given to coverage of factual intelligence and security 
issues by non-print media, such as television or radio.1 Broadcast non-fiction programmes 
offered a form of coverage akin to a non-fiction written publication, the most significant 
difference being perhaps the reach that could be achieved in terms of audience, with millions 
of viewers potentially tuning in. Such programmes therefore warrant critical attention on 
account of the influence they could exert, in terms of informing the general public. Through 
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previously closed archival material held at the BBC Written Archives Centre,2 this article 
considers an episode of the Spy! television series, which approached episodes of recent 
intelligence history through dramatic reconstruction; a drama-documentary, or docudrama. Its 
depiction of the activities of Camp 020, an MI5 facility for captured German spies, included 
physical violence during an interrogation, which was subsequently fiercely contested by 
former members of staff from the establishment. For the most part, this struggle was played 
out in private correspondence with the BBC, while the general public was left with little 
reason to question what had been shown, thereby allowing the association of wartime British 
intelligence interrogations with physical abuse to go unchallenged. 
Captured enemy agents had potential value for the British intelligence and security 
committee during the war as double agents, their messages to Germany suggesting that they 
were still at liberty, while in fact their communications were under British control. In order to 
‘break’ a newly captured spy during interrogation, MI5’s officers stationed at Camp 020 were 
prepared to exert psychological pressure, such as the threat of execution should they refuse to 
cooperate, and would be willing to acknowledge that such pressure was used years later. 
However, the use of any form of physical abuse was strictly forbidden. The ‘first and 
unbreakable’ rule of the Camp’s Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel R.W.G. (‘Tin Eye’) 
Stephens, was ‘that physical violence was not to be used under any circumstance’.3 The 
reasoning that lay behind this rule, as Stephens himself explained after the war, was 
ultimately pragmatic; violence was felt to produce ‘answers to please’, and generally lowered 
the ‘standard of information’ obtained.4 The sole exception to this rule concerned the case of 
TATE, Wulf Schmidt, who was physically assaulted by a visiting interrogator, Colonel A.P. 
Scotland, of the London District Cage, a separate facility in Kensington run by the Prisoner 
of War Interrogation Service (PWIS), where Axis POWs were interrogated prior to their 
transfer to a POW camp. While the extent to which the Cage exceeded the bounds of 
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legitimate interrogation techniques has been discussed elsewhere,5 the fact that such 
behaviour was not tolerated at Camp 020 was demonstrated by the fact that, following the 
incident, Scotland was refused re-entry to the facility, and the use of external interrogators 
was subsequently forbidden.6 
Official information detailing the rules under which Camp 020 operated did not enter 
the public domain until the late 1990s. In common with most other aspects of the wartime 
British intelligence and security community, the authorities maintained a blanket silence 
about the activities of Camp 020 for several decades after the end of the war. Volume Four of 
the official history British Intelligence in the Second World War, which dealt with matters of 
security and counter-intelligence, made some reference to its work when it was eventually 
published in 1989, but was hardly extensive in its coverage. Official records relating to Camp 
020 were included in the third tranche of files released by the Security Service into the public 
domain in September 1999 and the following year the internal history of the camp, written by 
Stephens himself, was released in book form by the Public Record Office.7 This did not 
mean, however, that the general public was wholly unaware of the existence of the wartime 
facility until the turn of the century. By the time the official record was released, references to 
the Camp had long been available in the memoirs of German agents who had been held there: 
‘Many who had experienced the sharp end of the regime told hair-raising stories about 
executions at midnight and dummy firing squads, the latter apparently designed to give the 
prisoner one final opportunity “to save himself”’.8 Circumstantial support for such claims 
was provided by what was known of Stephens’ subsequent career, which had seen him 
charged with the abuse of prisoners under his control as head of a different facility at the end 
of the war, irrespective of the fact that all charges had been subsequently dropped.9 In short, 
by the time the official history stated categorically that ‘Violence was never used, either at 
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the first interrogation or later’, Camp 020 had already ‘acquired a very sinister reputation’,10 
one which persists in more recent publications about its work.11 
Alongside the literature which provided the unofficial history of Camp 020 came a 
BBC television series that brought it to the attention of an audience of millions. The Spy! 
series, developed and produced in the late 1970s and subsequently broadcast on BBC1 over 
six weeks in early 1980, coincided with a surge of public interest about intelligence affairs, in 
both fact and fiction. ‘The time could not have been riper for Spy!’, wrote Peter Fiddick in 
the Guardian, while the reviewer for the Financial Times considered the series 
‘providentially well timed’.12 In the autumn of 1979, audiences had been gripped by the 
BBC’s adaptation of John le Carré’s spy thriller Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy. The first episode 
was broadcast on BBC2 on 10 September, and viewing figures, no doubt given a boost by a 
strike that took ITV off the air, were high; some eight and a half million viewers tuned in, 
along with a further three million watching the weekly repeats which served as a refresher for 
baffled viewers the night before the latest episode.13 Hot on the heels of this fictional search 
for a Russian ‘mole’ came news of a real one; the public revelation that Anthony Blunt, 
Keeper of the Queen’s Pictures, had some decades earlier confessed to being the ‘Fourth 
Man’ in the Cambridge Spy Ring. 
The brainchild of ‘old Z Cars hand’ Allan Prior, who ‘spent three years dusting down 
volumes in the British Library finding out what he could about the victors and victims of 
espionage, before narrowing it down to six subjects’,14 Spy! proved popular with the viewing 
public. The first episode, broadcast at 9.35pm on Sunday 13 January 1980, was watched by 
an estimated audience of 4 million, equating to some 7.6% of the entire UK viewing 
population, growing to 7.5 million (14.3%) by its final episode.15 According to the BBC’s 
Audience Research Report,16 the first episode was also well received; its ‘Reaction Index’17 
was 76, which was considered ‘an encouraging start to the series’.18 The final episode of the 
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series, which told the story of Cynthia, ‘a spy on the French Embassy of the Vichy 
Government in Washington’, gained a Reaction Index of 74, the Audience Research report 
noting that the episode ‘was considered all the more interesting because it actually happened 
(‘the tangled web of international aspionage [sic] is even more thrilling when you realise it’s 
not all written by John le Carré’)’, while more generally ‘the bulk of the sample thought true 
spy stories an excellent theme for a television series’.19 Spy! also represented a particular 
approach to history on television. Consisting of ‘dramatised reconstructions of espionage 
stories’, it was an example of drama-documentary, an approach which the programme’s 
Executive Producer, Anthony (‘Tony’) Isaacs, was instrumental in developing at the BBC.20  
As well as proving popular with viewers, the series quickly attracted controversy. The 
first episode, ‘John Vassall’, which dramatized the Vassall affair, drew complaints from two 
of those who had been in Moscow at the time and who were represented in the programme; 
Lady Hayter, wife of the British Ambassador in Moscow, and Captain Geoffrey Bennett, the 
Naval Attaché at the Embassy, neither of whom had been notified that the programme was 
being developed, finding out about it a matter of days before it was broadcast. The BBC was 
swiftly forced to apologise to both Lady Hayter and Bennett ‘for not consulting them before 
portraying them’.21  Even greater controversy followed the broadcast of the second episode, 
which dramatized the work of Camp 020. The programme began with a voiceover which 
informed viewers: 
On the night of the third of September 1940, a year to the day after hostilities began, a 
German spy, who called himself Hans Hansen, landed somewhere between Oxford and 
London by parachute. This is a reconstruction of what happened to him, and to many of 
the German spies who entered Britain by one means or another during the war. Some 




Broadcast on 20 January against Roger Moore’s James Bond in Live and Let Die on ITV, a 
juxtaposition of fact and fiction that was not lost on reviewers, the controversy centred 
around the manner in which Hansen’s interrogation was portrayed.22 The viewers were told 
that it was essential to ‘break’ a prisoner within 48 hours to avoid suspicion from his German 
controllers. With no progress having been made by the 40-hour point, the monocle-wearing 
Commandant – unnamed, but clearly a representation of Stephens – was shown becoming 
increasingly agitated, demanding ‘more pressure’. His frustration with the interrogator 
increasing (‘Listen to them. A pair of bloody schoolboys having a philosophical 
discussion!’), the Commandant stormed into the Interrogation room, ordering both the 
interrogator and interpreter to leave. Barking threats of execution at the prisoner, the 
Commandant grabbed him by the collar, forcing him against the wall. ‘I could choke an 
answer out of you’, he snarled, slamming Hansen’s head into the wall, causing blood to run 
from his mouth. In an adjoining room, where the interrogation was being observed, the 
evicted interrogator was aghast: ‘What in God’s name is he doing? He’s going to kill him!’ 
‘Not quite’ replied another observer, a Major known only as Charles. During this exchange, 
slaps and thuds continued to be heard off-screen, as the assault continued. Back in the 
interrogation room, the prisoner was shown falling to the floor, seemingly unconscious. ‘Pick 
him up!’ ordered the Commandant, marching off. Re-entering the room, the interrogator 
asked the guards how the prisoner was. The guard replied with a smirk: ‘He’ll be alright, sir. 
Feeling a bit rough at the moment. Lack of sleep, I expect’. Later, back in the officers’ mess, 
the Major tells the interrogator, ‘He was never in any real danger, you know, we’re not 
allowed to kill people here. There was an incident some time ago, very ugly. Not one of our 
men, a visiting expert, thank goodness, but there was a hell of a row and the Home Secretary 
came down and made us promise to behave ourselves’, clearly a reference to the incident 
involving A.P. Scotland. The significance of the scene was not lost on the reviewers. In the 
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Sunday Telegraph, Philp Purser wrote that ‘despite stiff disavowals of the use of torture in 
Hugh Connor’s script (“My dear chap, we are English”), a little rough stuff was artfully 
introduced at a crucial moment in the psychological battery. Indeed, with his jack-boots, 
monocle and brilliantined hair the Commandant of the interrogation centre was played by 
Gary Raymond as a mirror image of the Gestapo Sturmbannfuhrer in a million lousy war 
films’.23  
But was it true? As Jean Seaton points out in her official history of the BBC, the 
Corporation was considered ‘the provider of authoritative information’, a sentiment reflected 
by the Financial Times, Chris Dunkley noting that ‘I suspect that many viewers watching 
next Sunday’s interrogation, with its disorientation techniques, its monocled officer strutting 
the mess in his jodhpurs, slapping his crop against his riding boots and knocking the prisoners 
about, will refuse to believe that such a monster ever ran an English counter intelligence 
centre. Yet we must assume that this reconstruction is broadly accurate (relying on the many 
well informed survivors to blow the whistle if not).’24 The scenes provoked a fierce backlash 
from a number of former Camp 020 staff, who objected strongly to this depiction of physical 
violence and did indeed try to blow the whistle. Shortly after the programme was broadcast, a 
group of 10 former Camp 020 secretaries – Kathleen Williams, Aenea Allen (nee 
McCallum), Eileen Ball, Helen Clegg, Nancy Farquarson, Joyce Hall (nee Bisset), Brenda 
Mitchell, Margaret Randall (nee Davidson), Margaret Reynolds and Frances Shanks (nee 
Lepper) – revealed their wartime employment in a letter to the Radio Times in which they 
voiced their objections to the programme.25 As ‘erstwhile members of the secretarial staff of 
Camp 020’, the signatories of the letter wished to ‘vigorously protest at the portrayal of the 
Commandant as a violent and ill-mannered bully’. While they readily conceded that Stephens 
himself was ‘of terrifying aspect’, they noted that he ‘was a skilled interrogator who obtained 
results without recourse to assault and battery’, emphasising that ‘the very basis of Camp 020 
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procedure was that nobody raised a hand against a prisoner’. They added that a secretary was 
‘always’ present in the interrogation room, ‘in order to take a verbatim record’. To the best of 
their accumulated, and considerable, knowledge, ‘only two prisoners suffered physical injury. 
One was struck by a visiting interrogator; immediately the Commandant knew of it he 
condemned the action in the strongest possible terms. (This must be the previous incident 
mentioned in the programme.) The other prisoner was killed when Camp 020 was hit by a 
German bomb’.26 The letter was published in the 9-15 February 1980 issue of the Radio 
Times, but only in certain regional editions, alongside a reply from the Producer of the series, 
Frank Cox. Cox offered a robust defence of his programme, explaining that its depiction of 
the Commandant ‘was reached by way of exhaustive research’. This included letters from Dr 
Harold Dearden, the Camp’s Medical Officer, along with unnamed 020 secretarial staff and 
former prisoners – Hansen himself, Eddie Chapman (‘ZigZag’), John Moe (‘Mutt’) and Tor 
Glad (‘Jeff’). Cox also drew attention to the 1948 Court Martial at which Stephens had been 
acquitted of charges of maltreatment of prisoners during his time commanding another 
interrogation facility at Bad Nenndorf at the end of the war. ‘On the basis of our researches,’ 
Cox concluded, ‘it would be dishonest of us to suggest that British wartime interrogations of 
agents were all conducted with the restraint of a peace-time courtroom’.27 
Cox’s reply served only to inflame the situation. Further 020 veterans now took up the 
cause, joining the secretaries in writing their own letters of complaint. Writing to the Editor 
of the Radio Times, the brothers Alan and William Shanks, both former Interrogation 
Officers at 020, stated that it was ‘totally false to suggest that physical violence played any 
part whatever in the interrogation techniques we used. Scenes in the programme depicting 
this…were complete nonsense and contrary to every principle upon which our work at 020 
was based’.28 They hoped that Cox would ‘make suitable public amends’ for the ‘grave 
injustice’ done to Stephens’ memory and ‘to every man and woman who worked there, since 
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had these things really happened we must all have known, and condoned them’. However, 
receiving nothing beyond a ‘stereotyped acknowledgement’ to their letter, Alan Shanks 
proceeded to send copies of the correspondence to the Director General of the BBC, Ian 
Trethowan, and subsequently to the BBC Complaints Commission, demanding that the BBC 
‘should take serious note of our protests, that it should re-examine its source material – and 
its conscience – and that it should acknowledge the grave errors of fact contained in the 
programme’, an acknowledgement that was expected to be ‘public and unqualified’.29 
Shanks’ letter to Trethowan prompted a response from Jonathan Rooper, a Senior Assistant in 
the BBC Secretariat, who wrote that ‘there is nothing we can really add to the reply by Frank 
Cox in “Radio Times”…we are satisfied that the programme, which was a dramatized version 
of real events, was properly researched and produced’.30 A further complaint was sent to 
Alasdair Milne, the BBC’s Director of Programmes, by Mrs Patricia Ward-Thomas, who was 
‘on the staff of the establishment virtually throughout its existence’.31 Milne replied on 19 
February, repeating Cox’s reply as published in the Radio Times in full. He felt that he could 
‘not do better by way of response’, adding: ‘It would seem that there is some disagreement 
about the nature of this aspect of interrogation but I can assure you that the production team 
concerned was at pains not to sensationalise. Nevertheless, I am sorry it (sic) their efforts 
have caused you concern.’32 Another Camp 020 veteran, F.G. Beith, proceeded to 
forensically dismantle Cox’s response in a 14-page paper sent to the Editor of the Radio 
Times, the Secretary of the BBC’s Programmes Complaints Commission and Trethowan. 
Given that he was ‘at Camp 020 for some time and served under Colonel Stephens for over 
three years’, Beith believed that he was ‘qualified to offer the attached comments and home 
truths’,33 pouring barely concealed scorn on the ‘exhaustive research’ conducted by the 
programme team, which had failed to prevent Cox from spelling Stephens’ name incorrectly. 
Beith took issue with, among other things, the value of the letters of the Camp’s medical 
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officer, Dr Dearden, offering his own opinion of the psychiatrist’s contribution to 020’s 
work: ‘Dr Dearden’s successes among enemy spies of different origins and many tongues, 
varied nationalities and toughened psyches were pathetically few, his threatened failures 
many. He was relegated to the practice of simple diagnoses and cures of physical disorders 
among a rudely healthy military staff…A less thick-skinned man – the interests he claimed 
included wrestling and boxing – would have resigned and left’.34 In terms of Cox’s claim to 
have interviewed staff from 020, who suggested that Stephens ‘was violent on occasions’ and 
that his was a tough regime, Beith agreed that it ‘was tough’. However, in relation to the 
‘alleged violence’ described in ‘Mr Cox’s arrogantly dismissive apologia’, Beith added: ‘if 
explosive speech is to rank with physical violence in the censorious Mr Cox’s catalogue of 
wrongs, Colonel Stephens was violent on very many occasions.’ Assuming that the ‘screen 
Hansen’ was actually TATE, ‘about whom much has already been written’, Beith conceded 
that the claim ‘that he was struck’ at Camp 020 ‘cannot be denied’, but emphasised that the 
incident had involved a visiting interrogator, reiterating that ‘no violence was used by 
Colonel Stephens or his staff against prisoners at Camp 020’. Beith closed with a swipe at the 
voiceover that had started the programme: ‘incidentally, there was a passing reference to 
some of the spies who passed through the place having “disappeared”. They didn’t. All were 
officially accounted for. Ask the Home Office’. Complaints about the programme also began 
to spread beyond the BBC, as the former Head of Camp 020’s Secretarial Staff, Miss Helen 
Clegg, wrote to Downing Street to express her concerns directly to the Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher. Having outlined the background, Clegg explained, ‘What I am concerned 
about now is that the corporation should not repeat the Camp 020 programme at a later date, 
or sell it, as part of the series, to an overseas broadcasting company…may I ask you please to 
bring pressure to bear on the BBC to acknowledge that their portrait of him [Stephens] is 
entirely false and to prevent them from showing the programme on Camp 020 again’.35 
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While the Complaints Commission again distanced itself from the issue, Beith’s letter 
to Trethowan prompted another reply from Rooper, who noted that the points he had raised 
were ‘being fully investigated’, and promised a reply from the Director-General ‘as soon as 
possible’.36 On 28 March, Rooper forwarded ‘the various papers containing details of 
complaints about the programme’ to Cox, noting that he ‘would be grateful for your 
advice’.37 The BBC’s internal inquiries continued into May; in response to letters from 
Williams and Beith, Rooper explained that a ‘full internal investigation is being carried out’, 
but that this had ‘been delayed by a casting crisis affecting one of the programmes for which 
the producer of “Camp 020” is responsible. This means that he was unexpectedly involved in 
large-scale auditioning and was not able to assist with the investigations in the weeks that this 
was in progress’.38 With the casting crisis at an end, Rooper hoped that the investigation 
would be completed in ‘the next week or so’. In the meantime, Rooper agreed with Cox that 
he ‘would try to draft a reply after watching the videotape’.39 Having done so, Rooper sent it 
to Cox for his comments. From the file material, this viewing appears to have constituted the 
substantive part of the BBC’s internal investigation. 
On 19 June Rooper’s draft letter, now signed by Trethowan, was sent to Beith, 
variants sent to the other complainants. The letter reaffirmed the BBC’s position that the 
source of information on the violence that had taken place – Hansen himself – was 
considered reliable: ‘so far as the interrogation of Hansen is concerned, our account was 
based on the evidence of Hansen himself (he is now a successful and respected journalist 
living in the UK) and I am satisfied that the way the interrogation was presented in the 
programme was fair and accurate’.40 The letter also sought to downplay concerns over the 
violence depicted on screen (‘My own reaction to this scene is that what was actually shown 
was comparatively mild, and could not be termed serious violence’), neglecting to mention 
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the horror on the interrogator’s face as he watched the assault continue off screen. Trethowan 
even offered a justification for the assault: 
The context of Colonel Stephens’ actions is of vital importance: it was made quite clear 
that his intervention in the Hansen interrogation was on the grounds that not enough 
progress was being made to allow the critical 48-hour deadline to be met…In short 
“Camp 020” was a study of a successful counter-espionage measure which was 
mounted in an entirely proper way. 
Trethowan was only willing to concede that such violence, which he considered ‘mild’, may 
well have been ‘exceptional’, and not a regular occurrence. In conclusion, the Director 
General attempted to placate those who had complained by pointing to the challenges faced 
when trying to recreate events for television: 
There is, of course, always likely to be a feeling on the part of those who were actually 
involved in events depicted in a television programme that the dramatization has given 
an inaccurate picture of what took place. In so far as details are concerned, this is bound 
to be so to some extent and I would not pretend that we could achieve absolute 
accuracy on all minor points. But this is not essential in order to give an overall 
impression that is correct…I am satisfied that the way the interrogation was presented 
in the programme was fair and accurate.41 
Such a comment about the ‘overall impression’ given by the programme served to effectively 
nullify his earlier admission that any violence may have been the exception rather than the 
rule. As such, Trethowan’s letter did little to placate the 020 veterans, while Rooper 
proceeded to inflame matters further in his response to the latest letters from Kathleen 
Williams and Aenea Allen, which effectively challenged the veterans’ ability to question the 
offending scene with authority:  
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…since no-one who has complained about ‘Camp 020’ claims to have witnessed the 
events depicted in the programme, there is no-one in a position to know that Hansen’s 
claim that he was struck by Colonel Stephens is untrue. With the greatest respect, you 
cannot expect that we should believe that you and your colleagues have disproved 
Hansen’s account on the sole grounds that you never witnessed violence while you 
were working at the Camp.42 
Similar comments were made by another BBC official, J.F. Wilkinson, in response to a 
further letter from Shanks to Trethowan. Wilkinson noted: ‘the programme’s account of that 
part of the interrogation conducted by Colonel Stephens, showing no one else present, was 
supported by first hand information. If you or any other of your former colleagues were there 
at the time it is puzzling why, to our knowledge, none of you has yet come forward to say 
so’.43 The observation proved timely. Only once during the broadcast programme had the 
German agent been referred to by his real name, Wulf Schmidt, codename TATE. Rather, he 
was referred to by the entirely fictitious name Hans Hansen. As such, the reference was 
missed by a number of the correspondents, who wrote further once Hansen’s true identity had 
become clear, thanks to the publication of a tie-in book related to the series.44 On 27 August, 
Williams wrote again to Rooper. Now aware that the spy in question was Schmidt, she could 
challenge the version of events depicted on screen with confidence: ‘I was present at the 
Commandant’s interrogation of Wolf Schmidt on his arrival at Camp 020. When Schmidt 
learned that we had already been informed of his coming and were awaiting him he decided 
to confess’. She added that she ‘remained throughout’ the interrogation, and was ‘not, as was 
the secretary in the programme, rudely ordered out by the Commandant’, who ‘remained 
seated at the table throughout’. Clearly jubilant, she continued: ‘I think you must now accept 
that the foregoing…disposes of your point that none of us is in a position to know that 
Hansen’s “claim that he was struck by Colonel Stephens is untrue”.’45 In reply, Rooper 
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somewhat begrudgingly conceded that her declaration ‘does indeed cast a new light on the 
matter’. Nevertheless, he proved reluctant to provide the admission Williams sought: 
In view of your declaration, the BBC would accept that doubt has been cast on the 
accuracy of Schmidt’s account of his interrogation. I wonder, however, if you can be 
certain that the interrogation which you attended was the only one which Schmidt was 
subjected to. Equally, though I have always stressed that our film concerned a particular 
and exceptional case, we would not have accepted Schmidt’s account by itself; we only 
did so because several other accounts indicated that it was an accurate representation.46 
 
Clearly having been informed about Williams’ statement, Shanks wrote again to both 
Wilkinson and Trethowan, noting ‘You now have in your possession a declaration from each 
of the two secretaries involved in the “Hansen” case…“Hansen’s” alleged statement that he 
was hit by Colonel Stephens must surely be seen now, even by you, for what it really is. 
Either “Hansen” (or Schmidt, call him what you will) has lied and you have believed him – 
or, as I personally suspect, he never said it at all!’47 The development appears to have caused 
some concern within the BBC; Trethowan scribbled across the top of the letter; ‘I believe we 
are on rather shaky ground on this issue.’ Yet any such private doubts did not prevent the 
continued defence of the programme. In reply to Shanks, Wilkinson wrote along similar lines 
to Rooper, noting that while Williams’ letter ‘does indeed cast doubt on the information we 
have received from Hansen’: 
…we did not rely solely on his information: it was corroborated by the accounts of 
other former inmates of the Camp, a former member of the Camp’s interrogation staff, 
and a former secretary at the Camp. Thus, while I accept Miss Williams’ statement, I 
do not believe there is cause for the BBC to reconsider its view on the programme.  
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In closing, he reiterated the BBC’s regret at causing distress; ‘Our purpose was simply to 
show an immensely efficient counter-intelligence process in action’.48 Shanks considered the 
reply ‘a most extraordinary letter…I can hardly believe that it is meant as a serious 
contribution’.49  
To the incredulity of the 020 veterans, the BBC continued to defend the programme, 
and its own interpretation of the history of Camp 020. In reply to a further letter from 
Williams, Rooper noted that ‘Schmidt has claimed to us that he was struck by Colonel 
Stephens, and so have other former inmates of the Camp. We have also received 
corroboration of these incidents from former members of the Camp’s staff’, reiterating that 
the BBC ‘made the programme in good faith and, having done my best to review impartially 
all the information and everything that you and others have written about it, I cannot accept 
that we have done a grave injustice to anybody or that the impression left by the programme 
is as you suggest.’50 Shanks, meanwhile, continued to press the four points from his earlier 
letter, asking for further details of what the former prisoners had said, and for a copy of the 
letter written by Dearden.51 This was too much for the DG. On top of Shanks’ letter, 
Trethowan scribbled ‘I think the time has come to say “No”. We can’t reveal our informants. 
The programme had a relatively small audience, and was broadcast nearly a year ago. I agree 
this most tiresome affair should come to an end’, a sentiment conveyed in the letter ultimately 
sent, which also emphasised that ‘the incidents depicted in the Camp 020 programme were 
carefully corroborated in each case’.52 Writing to Williams on 24 November, Rooper 
similarly noted that ‘I can assure you that nothing was included in the “Spy” programme on 
“Camp 020” that was not corroborated by at least two separate sources.’53 Shanks continued 
to press further for the BBC to reveal its sources, to no avail.54 On the basis of the BBC’s 
refusal, Shanks was prepared to let the matter drop, concluding that ‘your insistence upon a 
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spurious plea of confidentiality is an open admission that the “supporting evidence” of certain 
named individuals will not bear scrutiny’.55 
 The affair dragged on into 1981. Unhappy with the BBC’s treatment of their 
complaints, the former members of 020 who had continued their correspondence – Clegg, 
Williams, Allen, Mr and Mrs Shanks and Beith – together took their complaint to the 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission.56 Their efforts were in vain; on 10 July, the Secretary 
to the BCC replied that the body, only set up in June 1981, had ’no authority to consider 
programmes broadcast before 1st June 1981’.57 The papers were instead passed on to the 
BBC, where there was no enthusiasm for further discussion.58 Further support for the 
veterans’ cause was now forthcoming from T.A. (‘Tar’) Robertson, the wartime MI5 officer 
who had been responsible for running double-cross agents as Head of its B1A section, and 
who had worked closely with Schmidt. On 8 July 1981 Robertson wrote to Clegg, noting that 
he had watched the programme and had been ‘horrified at its inaccuracy’: 
The agent depicted in the film was, in fact, one of my best agents…I am still in touch 
with him, as he lives in this country and he comes to see me from time to time. After 
the appearance of the film he rang me up in a frenzy and declared that it was the most 
despicable piece of nonsense he had ever seen, and said over and over that he had 
received fair treatment from all at 020 and that he had never once had a finger laid on 
him by anyone, and the part which shows him beaten up by Stephens was disgraceful.59 
Given that Schmidt had been assaulted by Scotland while at 020, an incident that was already 
acknowledged by the complainants, his claim never to have ‘had a finger laid on him by 
anyone’ is surprising. Nevertheless, Clegg was quick to inform the Complaints Commission 
of the development,60 while Shanks notified Trethowan, pointing out that ‘It must be plain 
therefore that in claiming that this scene is based upon the evidence of “Hansen” himself, you 
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have been quite shamefully misinformed by those responsible for the programme, and so 
misled into taking the stance you have over this affair’.61 
 
The BBC, then, found itself increasingly backed into a corner. The secretaries present 
at Schmidt’s interrogations were prepared to state that no physical assault had taken place, 
while Schmidt himself also denied any such treatment. The BBC’s response was to stonewall, 
as problems with the depiction of events given by the programme were now revealed 
internally. In a memo dated 17 September, Rooper gave the fullest explanation of the 
circumstances surrounding the programme that was committed to paper, and which warrants 
quoting at length: 
The Camp 020 lobby has been a very well organised and persistent one. They have 
attacked the programme we broadcast in January 1980…on the grounds that it 
misrepresented the commandant of the Camp, Colonel Stephens. In fact, the production 
team had access to information and corroborating evidence which showed that the 
portrayal of Colonel Stephens was by no means unfair – indeed, that it was a pale 
shadow of the truth. In any event, the ‘violence’ which Colonel Stephens was shown to 
use in the programme was mild by the standards of television; he merely slapped a spy 
under interrogation round the face. 
Our achilles heel is that the story told in the programme was a composite of the 
experiences of two spies who were interrogated at the Camp. The scriptwriter was 
aware of this, but the producer did not learn about it until after the first few exchanges 
between us and Camp 020 staff. By that stage we had leaned fairly heavily on the 
information we had received from [Schmidt] and had acknowledged his identity. It is of 
course this spy whom Mr Shanks refers to in his letter as denying that he was ever 
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treated at all roughly by Colonel Stephens; it was the other spy who was treated in the 
way shown in the programme (though he was by no means the only one to suffer the 
experience). 
I think we should stick to our guns because there is a good chance the lobby will go 
away if we do. There is a slight risk that we may be embarrassed by external pressure 
from MPs etc if the lobby continue to press their case, but it seems to me it would be 
more damaging to admit that we had used composite characters in a dramatized 
reconstruction without making this clear on the air and without acknowledging the fact 
during several exchanges of letters.62 
At the bottom of the letter, a scribbled note added: ‘not a happy situation. The trouble is that 
if we do not admit the error the [sic] Shanks and others will be convinced that we are lying. 
But if at this stage we do admit it!’ The BBC followed Rooper’s advice, and continued to 
weather what remained of the storm, suggesting in further correspondence that ‘it is now time 
to let the matter drop’.63 Immovable in its defence of the programme, the correspondents 
came to realise that there was little point in pursuing the matter further. Kathleen Williams 
made one further effort at a formal complaint, this time to the Chairman of BBC Governors, 
George Howard.64 An internal minute which followed drew attention to Rooper’s earlier 
correspondence, noting; ‘You will see the reasons set out there why we decided to stick to 
our guns and presumably we shall continue to do so’.65 
 Rooper’s memo represents the only written admission amongst the official paperwork 
that there were problems with its depiction of Schmidt’s time at Camp 020, yet it remains less 
than satisfactory, relying quite heavily on suggestion and innuendo in the place of full 
disclosure. Did the BBC actually have incontrovertible evidence of physical abuse being 
carried out at Camp 020? What exactly was it that made the depiction of Stephens a ‘pale 
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shadow of the truth’? Who were the other spies who suffered the same experience as that 
depicted in the programme? And perhaps most importantly, if the programme had indeed 
been a ‘composite’ of the experiences of two spies held at 020, and the experience of 
violence had not come from Schmidt, then what was the identity of the other spy? In this 
reverse whodunnit, the initial response from Cox, published in the Radio Times, provides us 
with a shortlist of potential victims, naming three further spies who had been consulted by the 
production team, and who ‘gave us detailed accounts of their experience at the hands of 
Colonel Stevens’ [sic]: Eddie Chapman, John Moe (‘Mutt’) and Tor Glad (‘Jeff’). Did any of 
these men experience ill treatment at Scotland’s hands, or those of his officers, during 
interrogation? There is no evidence in the public domain which supports such a suggestion. 
Nigel West, who had been involved with the research for both the programme and the book, 
would later write in his own history of MI5 that Chapman ‘was so angry about being locked 
up and treated as a spy that he threatened not to co-operate unless he was released 
immediately’, while Moe ‘was merely irritated by the attitude of his captors. He too protested 
about Stephens’ accusations and spent only a minimum time at 020’.66 As Hoare notes, both 
Moe and Glad together spent ‘no more than 24 hours’ at 020.67 Cox’s original letter also 
made reference to interviews with staff about Stephens, ‘who told us that his was a tough 
regime and that he was violent on occasions’. Was this actually a reference to physical 
violence? No one denied that Stephens had ‘a fearsome reputation as a temperamental 
authoritarian’ with a short fuse, but it has also been suggested that ‘his intimidating manner 
and appearance were largely an act for interrogation purposes’.68 Ultimately then, the 
narrative denouement of the ‘020 affair’ as told by the file material remains problematic; 
perhaps the most that can be said is that while the possibility of further incidents of assault 




 This would not be the first, or last, time that a broadcast drama-documentary would 
prove controversial; as Kilborn notes, ‘Of all the television formats which have over the years 
secured a place for themselves in the broadcasting schedules the docudrama…is the one 
which has possibly occasioned the most lively, and at times the most heated, debate’.69 Some 
consider the form too tempting for broadcasters ‘to indulge in an irresponsible “monkeying 
around with actuality”’, something the Shanks brothers believed had occurred in the cases of 
the 020 episode, drawing a distinction between artistic license, which they considered 
‘permissible if a dull and otherwise uninspiring item is thereby transformed into good 
television’, and ‘gross distortion of fact’.70 Even if history had been rewritten for public 
consumption, did it matter? Certainly to the veterans themselves, who clearly felt that their 
personal integrity had been slighted. In a letter to Trethowan, Shanks observed that ‘Viewers 
could quite readily assume from this scene that this was permissible practice at the camp, that 
other interrogators also indulged in it, and that it was generally condoned. I find this a 
reflection upon my wife, who is a former secretary at the camp, upon myself as a former 
interrogating officer, and upon the memory of my late brother who was also for a time an 
officer at Camp 020’.71 In expressing such concerns over what the public would now believe, 
Shanks reflected a more general criticism of the docudrama format: ‘In the case of audience 
response to DDs, one of the most frequently made assumptions is that audiences will simply 
not be in a position to separate fictional from factual. They are…in danger of being seriously 
misled, since the factually based material has invisibly merged with various types of fictional 
elaboration and this amalgam created its own reality’.72 But is this actually the case? Would 
viewers have readily assumed the worst, as Shanks feared? Some are sceptical over the 
powers ascribed to docudrama, suggesting that ‘The claim that DDs have a decisive effect on 
the way that audiences construct their conception or social and political reality has been 
“asserted far more often than it has been tested”’.73 A US study, conducted within a few years 
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of the broadcast of the Spy! series, put that assertion to the test, exploring the prevailing 
orthodoxy that the documentary drama format ‘powerfully influences viewers’ conceptions of 
social and political reality’.74 Its conclusions suggested otherwise; while acknowledging that 
there was the possibility that a degree of influence could be exerted, the format ultimately 
lacked the power to ‘hypnotise’ its audience; rather, the reinforcement of an existing view 
was altogether more likely than ‘conversion’.75 What existing knowledge would the general 
public, as opposed to the interested observer, have had upon which to base its view of the 
British intelligence community in 1980? Likely little of substance, owing to the dearth of 
reliable information in the public domain about its work at this point; SIS, the Security 
Service and GCHQ were not yet avowed, while the Waldegrave, or Open Government, 
Initiative, which would see thousands of previously secret documents released into the public 
domain, was over a decade away, the release of MI5’s own historical papers even further. 
However, altogether more prominent in the public domain were allegations about ill 
treatment during interrogation by UK security authorities in the relation to the ongoing 
Troubles in Northern Ireland. The audience was more likely to have been aware of the fact 
that interrogation could prove controversial; November 1971 had seen the UK prosecuted by 
the Republic of Ireland for the use of the ‘five techniques’76 during interrogation of 14 men 
interned in Northern Ireland, while in January 1976 the Commission of Human Rights 
concluded that these techniques constituted torture ‘when used in combination’.77 Would the 
audience have been particularly surprised by a physical assault during wartime interrogation 
when the UK had admitted to the use of such methods during peacetime? Indeed, beyond 
application of such techniques, the possibility of physical assault during interrogation was 
raised in March 1979, less than a year before Spy! aired, when the Bennett Report into police 
interrogation procedures in Northern Ireland drew attention to a number of instances where 
injuries, which were not self-inflicted, were ‘sustained during detention’.78 Would such near 
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contemporary affairs stories have served to reinforce the wartime interrogation as depicted on 
screen? At almost 40 years remove it is, of course, impossible to answer this question. It is, 
however, possible to discern the shadow of contemporary interrogation in some of the 
correspondence between the 020 veterans and the BBC. In one of his letters to Beith in which 
he defended the approach to interrogation depicted on screen, Trethowan argued that 
‘Systems of this kind are perfectly justifiable in peacetime police work; who could doubt that 
in the midst of the Second World War they were essential?’79 
 One area where a little more can be said in terms of consequences concerns the 
reaction among Whitehall civil servants. The Spy! series in general, and the 020 episode in 
particular, was used by government officials, somewhat counterintuitively, to argue in favour 
of continued secrecy surrounding wartime intelligence and security activity. In early 1980, 
the question of whether the final two volumes of the Official History, British Intelligence in 
the Second World War, should be published was under discussion. While publication of the 
first three volumes had been approved by Jim Callaghan, his successor as Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, was far less supportive of the project. In a note for Sir Robert Armstrong, 
the Cabinet Secretary, H.L. Theobald of the Cabinet Office Historical Section drew attention 
to the ‘avid public interest in clandestine operations in peace and war’: 
There has been little pause since the History was first commissioned in the appearance 
of books and articles, TV and radio presentations about all aspects of intelligence 
activity; and recently the flow has, if anything, increased.80 
Theobald’s observation marks one of the earliest official discussions of unofficial coverage of 
intelligence matters that broadens its definition to include works broadcast on television or 
radio, viewing these with the same measure of concern as written publications.81 That 
Theobald had the series in mind is clearly illustrated by a further minute in which he pointed 
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to an article in the Sunday Telegraph concerning double agent work, which he considered 
‘symptomatic of the private publications which are now emerging, and which appear destined 
to be reflected in the current BBC1 TV series “Spy!”.’82 Further attention was drawn to the 
programme in an analysis of manuscript of Volume Four of the official history prepared by 
Sir Robert’s Private Secretary, D.J. Wright, who noted that publication ‘could provide a rich 
source of material for journalists, academics and television’. Under the sub-heading of 
‘Media Treatment’, he pointed to the specific cases of the double cross agents GARBO, 
SNOW and ZIGZAG, noting that ‘there is a hard-core who worked for British intelligence 
throughout the whole war and whose cases could certainly provide a basis for a successful 
media treatment. The recent BBC series “Spy”, which contained individual dramatisations of 
spy cases, seems to be the sort of programme which could benefit from the publication of this 
material.’83 The point was incorporated into Sir Robert’s submission to the Prime Minister on 
the question of publication:  
The recent BBC “Spy” series of dramatisations of individual spy cases seems to be the 
sort of programme which could benefit from the publication of this material. One of the 
programmes in January, I believe, dealt with Camp 020, an interrogation centre for 
suspected enemy agents which is frequently mentioned in the History…Although the 
detailed description of the work of Camp 020 has been omitted in the sanitisation, the 
activities (sometimes understandably rather grisly) of an interrogation centre are likely 
to remain of real interest to journalists and the object of further investigative 
“digging”.84  
Such observations were hardly likely to assuage the Prime Minister’s concerns, with Thatcher 
ultimately concluding that neither of the remaining volumes should be published.85 Informing 
a colleague at the Ministry of Defence of the decision not to publish, Sir Robert explained 
that the concern that such a move would ‘fuel rather than damp down the flame of current 
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Press interest in and curiosity about all intelligence and security matters…Neither volume is 
therefore to be published and they are both being put into cold storage until it is thought 
appropriate to consider once again the possibility of publishing them’.86 Ill-informed 
coverage of intelligence matters remained preferable to more accurate accounts as far as the 
authorities were concerned, at least for the time being. 
Some 18 years on from the broadcast of the Spy! series, by which point the Security 
Service had started to release its historical papers into the public domain, among them 
Schmidt’s MI5 case file, the BBC broadcast another documentary about MI5 activity during 
the Second World War.87 Benefitting from access to this recently-released file, the 
programme – which included an on-screen interview with Alan and Frances Shanks, fierce 
critics of the earlier programme – offered an altogether less dramatic reconstruction of 
Schmidt’s interrogation, as a camera showed an empty interrogation room while a voiceover 
read extracts from the transcript of the interrogation, with not so much as a hint of a physical 
assault taking place. While Stephens continued to be characterised as terrifying, this time no 
suggestion of physical violence at the facility was made; Hugh Astor stated that he was 
‘absolutely certain that there was never any form of physical torture used’ (adding ‘a degree 
possibly of mental anxiety’). The earlier programme represents, perhaps, the ‘received 
wisdom’ described by John Ferris when discussing the history of another Second World War 
institution, Bletchley Park, back in 2000: ‘Our knowledge is received wisdom: what we have 
been told, not what we have learned. Much remains to be found and some to be forgotten’.88 
At a time when the availability of accurate, reliable information about the workings of British 
intelligence was limited, coupled with the reputation of the BBC as a source of reliable 
information and recent events in Northern Ireland, it can be suggested, at least, that the 
general audience would likely have accepted what they had been told, even if they thought 
little more about it as they got on with their everyday lives. The association of wartime 
25 
 
intelligence interrogation with physical abuse was allowed to stand, effectively unchallenged, 
in the public arena. While the efforts of the veterans to correct the impression given by the 
programme certainly deserve to be remembered, its depiction of a physical assault on a 
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